In theory, demand curves for stocks are kept flat by riskless arbitrage between perfect substitutes. In reality, however, individual stocks do not have perfect substitutes. The risk inherent in arbitrage between imperfect substitutes may deter risk-averse arbitrageurs from flattening demand curves. Consistent with this suggestion and a simple model of demand curves for stocks, we find that stocks without close substitutes experience differentially higher price jumps upon inclusion into the S&P 500 Index. 
I. Introduction
In theory, demand curves for stocks are kept flat by arbitrage between perfect substitutes. As Scholes (1972) explains in a classic study of large-block sales, "The market will price assets such that the expected rates of return on assets of similar risk are equal. If any particular asset should be selling to yield a higher expected return due solely to the increase in the quantity of shares outstanding . . . investors seeing these profit opportunities would soon arbitrage them away."
The arbitrage Scholes envisions is simple and fundamental: buy the underpriced stock and go long a perfect substitute, or do the opposite to arbitrage an overpriced stock.
This requires no net investment, and earns an instant and riskless profit from a portfolio which can be liquidated whenever prices move back in line. When repeated by competing arbitrageurs, this strategy keeps demand curves for stocks flat.
Is this a compelling argument? One can point to the fact that between-stock arbitrage is widely pursued by investment professionals. that use "pairs trading" or "relative value trading" or "market neutral long/short trading" as one of their principal equity investment strategies. 1 Although there is undoubtedly some arbitrage activity in real stock markets, it is not clear that arbitrage works as well as Scholes suggests. A potential problem is that individual stocks do not, in practice, have perfect substitutes. Would-be arbitrageurs who take positions in a mispriced stock, and hedge with opposite positions in imperfect substitutes, face the risk that the two return streams do not cancel out. 2 Risk averse arbitrageurs will trade less aggressively if they must bear arbitrage risk (De Long et al.
(1990)).
These contrasting observations indicate the need for a closer examination of the arbitrage argument for flat demand curves. This paper attempts to provide one. We start with a simple model of demand curves for stocks that captures the theoretical role of arbitrage. We then test some predictions of this model using the cross-section of price responses of stocks added to the Standard & Poor's 500 Index.
The model considers two groups of investors, arbitrageurs and non-arbitrageurs.
Arbitrageurs differ from non-arbitrageurs in two ways: they hold zero-net-investment portfolios, and they have correct beliefs about the long-run fundamental value of stocks.
We horizontally sum each group's demand curve to get an aggregate demand curve. The This model predicts that the response to an excess demand shock increases with the shock's size and the stock's arbitrage risk. We test this using the cross-section of price responses of stocks added to the S&P 500 Index. Upon addition to the Index, stocks are bought heavily by index funds that track the Index. Since a stock is added to the Index only when another stock must be dropped (usually because of merger, takeover, or bankruptcy), the sudden surge in index fund demand for the added stock is arguably an exogenous demand shock. 3 We focus on additions made between 1976 and September 1989, since more recently index changes are pre-announced. This causes a serious confounding effect since arbitrageurs will very likely prefer front-running the index funds (between the announcement date and the effective date) over the Scholes arbitrage trade [Beneish and Whaley (1996) , Ip (1998) ].
Harris and Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986) report that added stocks' prices jump an average of three percent on the day of the change. Shleifer (1986) , Dhillon and Johnson (1991), Edmister, Graham, and Pirie (1994), Beneish and Whaley (1996) , and
Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) find that these jumps are largely permanent, which suggests that they reflect downward sloping aggregate demand curves. 4 For each stock added to the S&P 500, we measure the size of the index fund demand shock and the stock's arbitrage risk. Index fund size data is from Standard & Poor's. Arbitrage risk is measured as the historical variance of a zero-net-investment portfolio that holds $1 long (equivalently, short) in the added stock and $1 short (equivalently, long) in a portfolio of substitutes. This measure of risk is indicated by the model.
Our main results are as follows. First, stocks do not have perfect substitutes.
While this is obvious in general, it is surprising how hard it is to find even reasonably close substitutes. For our median stock, one cannot hedge away even a quarter of the stock's daily return variance. 5 Second, high arbitrage risk stocks do indeed experience higher price jumps, controlling for demand shock size. Third, stocks hit by especially large index fund demand shocks also experience higher price jumps, controlling for arbitrage risk. Finally, our regressions provide some numerical estimates of the slopes of stocks' demand curves. They fall around the middle of the range of previous estimates.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that risk prevents arbitrage from completely flattening demand curves for stocks, and are consistent with our simple model of the Scholes argument. Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine other plausible ways of modeling the interaction between index funds and suppliers of stock. We consider two alternative models. In the first, suppliers are well-diversified (holding long positions), and charge a premium which depends on the diversification benefit lost by selling the stock.
If this is the case, high beta stocks might sell for a lower premium than low beta stocks.
We do not find evidence of this effect in our data.
In the second alternative model we consider, demand curves slope downward only because of the heterogeneous beliefs of non-arbitrageurs. Arbitrage is irrelevant (evidence on the existence of arbitrage notwithstanding). The finding that arbitrage risk matters simply reflects the correlation of arbitrage risk with this omitted variable. We test this view using the heterogeneity of analysts' earnings forecasts as a proxy for the heterogeneity of non-arbitrageurs' beliefs. This proxy has little ability to explain addition day returns, while arbitrage risk retains its strong magnitude and significance.
We conclude that an arbitrage-based explanation is the one that is most consistent with the full set of results. This suggests that the fundamental arbitrage trades envisioned by Scholes are often too risky to be relied upon to eliminate an overpricing of a couple of percentage points (the average S&P effect). In a cross-sectional sense, however, this view does receive support; stocks that have closer substitutes also appear to have flatter demand curves. The results also suggest a broader conjecture. If their demand curves slope more steeply, high arbitrage risk stocks are more vulnerable to shifts in investor sentiment and more likely to exhibit psychology-driven anomalies. Some intriguing preliminary support for this prediction comes from the fact that small stocks in our sample are significantly riskier to arbitrage than large stocks. As Loughran and Ritter (1999) point out, "just about every known stock market pattern is stronger for small firms than for large firms."
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents a simple model in which risk deters arbitrageurs from flattening aggregate demand curves. Section III characterizes the arbitrage risk of stocks added to the S&P 500, and presents evidence that suggests arbitrage risk affects the slope of demand curves. Section IV concludes.
II. A model of demand curves for stocks
The model consists of two types of investors, arbitrageurs and non-arbitrageurs. A.
Demand curves of arbitrageurs
Consider a market of n risky assets, purchased at t = 0 and sold at t = 1. Returns and .
This solution is intuitive. The arbitrageur faces a mean-variance objective.
Holdings of asset j alone determine the expected return of the portfolio, since only it has nonzero expected return. Given the commitment $ a j x , all other assets are held to minimize the overall risk of the portfolio, subject only to the zero-net-investment constraint. Quantity A j is asset j's "arbitrage risk." It is the variance of the minimum variance portfolio which is long $1 in asset j and short, on net, $1 in other assets. 6 For example, if asset j has a perfect substitute, A j is zero. If the expected return on asset j is positive (negative), the arbitrageur invests $ It is useful to visualize the solution as a downward sloping demand curve. Denote
Under the approximation that , 1
equation (1) indicates that the arbitrageur's excess demand curve has an intercept of 1 and a slope of -kA j in (x, * j j P P ) space. As is intuitive, if risk aversion is zero or the asset has perfect substitutes, the demand curve is flat (i.e., infinitely elastic).
B. Demand curves of non-arbitrageurs
To define the excess demand of non-arbitrageurs, we propose the specification Assuming that non-arbitrageurs' excess demand is zero at the fundamental price, then, using the return approximation as above, their excess demand curve has an intercept of 1 and a slope of -h j in (x,
The aggregate demand curve and the mispricing induced by a demand shock
The aggregate excess demand curve is the horizontal sum [ ]
, we can plug this demand into (4) to show that the excess return to a demand shock of $S is simply
Special cases illustrate the comparative statics. When the asset has perfect substitutes (A j is zero), arbitrageurs completely flatten the aggregate demand curve, so any shock is absorbed without any price change. Another special case that preserves market efficiency and flat demand curves is when there are infinitely many arbitrageurs.
The presumed existence of infinitely many small and locally risk neutral arbitrageurs is the traditional fallback argument for market perfection and efficiency even when arbitrage is risky. 8 Otherwise, if the available substitutes are imperfect, there are few and risk-averse arbitrageurs, and non-arbitrageurs disagree about the fundamental value of the asset, the aggregate demand curve slopes significantly, and the price response to an excess demand shock is large. This section presents empirical tests based on this intuition. We consider the price responses of stocks added to the S&P 500 Composite Index. Upon inclusion into the Index, stocks are bought heavily by numerous index funds that track the Index. These funds have an incentive to minimize tracking error by buying as soon as the changes are made effective. Since a stock is added to the Index only when another stock must be dropped, usually because of merger, takeover, or bankruptcy, the sudden surge in index fund demand for the added stock arguably represents an exogenous demand shock.
Since the supply curve of the stock is fixed and vertical (in the short run at least), the size of the price jump following this demand shock is determined by the slope of the stock's aggregate demand curve and the size of its shift. If arbitrage risk is a limiting factor in the slope of demand curves, we should find that this jump is differentially larger for high arbitrage risk stocks, controlling for shock size. Note, we do not evaluate a trading strategy. Our model predicts that the equilibrium price response to a demand shock depends implicitly on the risk of a particular zero-net-investment trading strategy.
Although equation (5) To measure shock size, we rely on Standard and Poor's own estimates of the cumulative size of all funds indexed to the S&P 500. Given these estimates, the fact that the S&P 500 is a value-weighted index, the aggregate capitalization of the S&P 500, and the capitalization of the added stock, we can estimate the dollar value of the index fund demand shock to each added stock. We also measure demand shock size in terms of the log of the dollar value shock and the percent shock (in terms of the added firm's capitalization).
We first describe our addition event sample. 12 Raw event day returns for the remaining 259 stocks in this subsample average 3.29% (SD = 2.32%) and returns over the market average 3.16% (SD = 2.29%). These summary statistics are similar to those reported by previous authors.
Negative event day returns are rare in the last years of our sample, presumably reflecting the effect of larger demand shocks by growing index funds.
B. Variables
The measurable right-hand-side variables in equation (5) 
The implied arbitrage strategy is for every $1 long in Church's, to short $1 in T-bills, small stocks tend to have higher arbitrage risk than large stocks. In our sample, the correlation between log (market value) and A is negative and significant at 0.1%.
Index fund demand shock size, S, is easier to measure. Since the S&P 500 is a value-weighted index, the ratio of total S&P 500-indexed assets to total S&P 500 capitalization identifies the percentage of each included firm that is demanded by index funds. Table II Over the same period, the total capitalization of the S&P 500 grew by less than 900%, from $662 billion in 1976 to $5,626 billion in 1996. Thus, as indicated in row three, the percentage of firm capitalization demanded by index funds has grown strongly, from about 3% in 1976 to more than 8% in 1996.
The fourth row of Table II calculates the size of the demand shock, in current millions of dollars, for the year's median-size addition. It is simply the median dollar value of the percentage shocks reported in row three. This variable varies across firms within a year, in contrast to the percentage shock variable which varies only across years. 16 For purposes of comparison, we also gather data on stocks added to the S&P 500 in 1992 and 1996 for this row.
C. Empirical results
Equation (5) predicts that event returns should be increasing in arbitrage risk and shock size. Table III reports OLS estimates of models of announcement day returns.
Specifications (1) through (4) show that arbitrage risk and demand shock size are both positively and significantly related to event returns. Given their very high correlation with each other (above 0.98), it is not surprising that the various arbitrage risk measures have similar predictive power. Specification (5) illustrates that the demand shock measured in percentage terms is also strongly related to event returns. The results of Table III broadly confirm two qualitative predictions of our model. Announcement day returns are significantly higher among stocks without close substitutes, and among stocks hit by large index fund demand shocks.
The model also predicts that event day returns ought not respond to the component of risk that can be substituted away, only to arbitrage risk. Specifications (6) and (7) test this prediction. In both specifications, the explained component of risk is not significantly related to event returns. 17 Finally, specifications (8) and (9) consider an alternative specification. Under equation (5), arbitrage risk and shock size do not enter linearly. In particular, when the demands of non-arbitrageurs are relatively inelastic (h is high), non-arbitrageurs do not supply stock to index funds. Only arbitrageurs satisfy the demand shock. In this case, equation (5) predicts that the interaction of arbitrage risk and shock size is what best explains event returns. Specifications (8) and (9) confirm that, not surprisingly, the interaction of arbitrage risk and shock size is a strong predictor of event returns.
One potential challenge to our interpretation of these results is an imperfect indexing effect: If indexers try to minimize tracking error but face costs to altering their portfolio every time a stock is added and deleted, then all else (shock size) equal, they will prefer to add the stocks that are less correlated with other securities. Effectively, arbitrage risk may pick up some of the influence of the unmeasured component of actual shock size. From what indirect evidence we could gather, however, this does not appear to be a crucial effect in practice. We found that announcement day volume, relative to historical average volume, or as a percent of dollar shock size, is not differentially higher for high arbitrage risk stocks (not reported).
It is possible to imagine other ways of formulating the interaction between index funds and their suppliers of stock. Our arbitrage-based model, while incorporating Scholes's important theoretical argument, is one of several models that may seem reasonable ex ante. We have considered two other specific models. 18 In the first, index funds purchase stocks from suppliers who hold well-diversified long portfolios, such as a mutual funds. One empirical implication of this view might be that high beta stocks, since they contribute more risk to a well-diversified portfolio, would tend to sell for a lower premium, all else equal. We test this prediction by regressing event day returns on preevent betas, and find no relationship (not reported).
19
Another possibility is that our arbitrage risk measure is picking up some of the influence of the omitted variable h. One could imagine an extreme inefficient market model in which arbitrage is completely unimportant, and the aggregate demand curve depends entirely on the heterogeneity of non-arbitrageurs' beliefs. To test this interpretation, we proxied for the heterogeneity of investor beliefs using the heterogeneity of analysts' earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S. After considering both the dispersion of one-year-ahead and long-term earnings forecasts, we could not find a measure that was strongly positively related to event returns, whether before or after controlling for arbitrage risk (not reported). 20 However, consistent with this model's premise that arbitrage risk is correlated with h, we do find a significant positive correlation between arbitrage risk and the heterogeneity of earnings forecasts, on the order of 0.20 to 0.30 depending on the measure.
Taken as a whole, the results indicate that arbitrage fails to flatten demand curves for stocks, and that this happens in part because perfect substitutes are not available. On the other hand, we concede that several specifications include a constant term of 2%. We also concede that the explanatory power of our regressions is not high. There remains a lot of unexplained variation. It is unclear whether these shortcomings reflect the fact that our regression model is misspecified [versus equation (5) To control for the interactive effect with arbitrage risk, we exclude stocks in the highest and lowest quartiles of the arbitrage risk distribution from the plot. Figure I confirms that larger shocks induce larger price responses, and the average does not reverse within twenty trading days. Given the standard errors reported in the table, the two series are statistically different on the announcement day (as is also clear from Table III) , but the rapid growth in the variance of cumulative returns (even after cleaning the sample)
causes the series to be statistically indistinguishable within ten days. Another way to express the economic significance of the results is in terms of the implicit slopes of aggregate demand curves. We present our calculations in Table IV . We estimate two slope measures, evaluated at the 25 th percentile, median, and 75 th percentile of arbitrage risk. The first measure is a semi-elasticity based upon specification (8) of Table III . As in the model, imagine an excess demand function plotted with P/P* on the vertical axis (where P* denotes the efficient price) and dollar excess demand on the horizontal axis. The excess demand axis extends in both positive and negative directions.
Assume excess demand is zero at P/P* = 1. If stocks are initially correctly priced at P/P* = 1 before the index fund demand shock, specification (8) of Table IV implies that a demand shock of $156 million will drive P/P* up to 1.01 for the median arbitrage risk stock. Equivalently, at an overpricing of 1%, market participants would offer an excess supply of $156 million.
This slope varies with arbitrage risk. For the stock at the 25 th percentile of arbitrage risk -relatively easy to arbitrage -it takes a demand shock of $222 million to induce a 1% return. (If this figure seems too large, remember that the perfect market benchmark is infinity.) For a stock at the 75 th percentile of the arbitrage risk distribution, on the other hand, a demand shock of $105 million is sufficient to induce a 1% return.
Our model applies most directly to these semi-elasticities, but we also measure traditional demand elasticities, in keeping with some of the prior literature. Specification (9) of Table III implies an elasticity of -7.87 for the median arbitrage risk stock; buying 7.87% of this stock would induce a 1% return.
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Note these figures imply flatter demand curves than what one would expect without doing the analysis in Table III 
IV. Summary and implications
Scholes (1972) suggests that arbitrage between perfect substitutes keeps the demand curves for a stock flat. While between-stock arbitrage is indeed a widely pursued investment strategy, most stocks do not have very close substitutes. This paper presents empirical evidence, from S&P 500 Index additions, which suggests that arbitrage risk is an important determinant of the demand curve's slope. After considering alternative explanations for this result, we conclude that the full set of results is most consistent with the interpretation that risk discourages arbitrage.
We see two avenues for future empirical research. The first would seek to confirm or refute the proposition that stocks' price responses to excess demand shocks depend on arbitrage risk. Potential shocks could include equity issues, repurchases, or takeovers. A stumbling block for such studies, however, is the difficulty of controlling for new information associated with the shock. Experiments as informationally clean as S&P 500 Index changes are rare.
A second avenue for research would explore the impact of imperfect arbitrage.
The guiding hypothesis is that true anomalies are likely to be severest in settings where arbitrage is most difficult. This observation has been made previously by De Long et. al.
(1990), Pontiff (1996) , and Shleifer and Vishny (1997), among others. To this end, we find it particularly interesting that arbitrage risk is higher for smaller stocks. This may help to explain Loughran and Ritter's (1999) observation that "just about every known stock market pattern is stronger for small firms than for large firms."
More generally, behavioral asset pricing models must first explain why arbitrage fails before they explore how irrational trading affects prices (Shleifer (1999) 
, where R sub1it , R sub2it , and R sub3it denote returns on three industry-, size-, and book-to-marketmatched "substitute" stocks. See text for details of the substitute selection procedure. Measure A 4i is the residual variance of
, where R hmlt and R smbt denote returns on the HML and SMB Fama-French (1993) factors. Note these factors represent zero-investment portfolios. We thank James Choi for calculating daily factor returns. Var(R it ) and Var(R it -R ft ) are estimated over the same interval as the arbitrage risk measures. E 1i is the "explained" variance Var(R it -R ft ) -A 1i . E 2i , E 3i , and E 4i are defined analogously. Table II . The demand shock to stocks added to the S&P 500 Index Selected years. All values are end-of-year, all monetary values are in current dollars. S&P 500-tracking index fund capitalization is an estimate of the aggregate capitalization of all public and private funds indexed to the S&P 500. S&P 500 total capitalization is the aggregate market capitalization of all 500 firms in the Index at the end of the given year. Data for these two items were provided by Standard & Poor's Index Services. The percentage of a newly-added firm's capitalization demanded by index funds is the ratio of S&P 500 index fund capitalization to S&P 500 total capitalization. The reported dollar value demand shock is the median shock over all firms in our sample that were added that year. This table presents OLS models of S&P 500 Index addition announcement day returns. The dependent variable is the excess return over the market (R it -R mt ). The sample includes 259 stocks added to the S&P 500 between September 1976 and September 1989. shock mil i is the dollar value of S&P 500 index fund demand, in millions of current dollars (sample mean = $64 (million), median = $51 (million), standard deviation = $64 (million)). shock pct i is the percent of the added firm's capitalization demanded by index funds (sample mean = 0.050, median = 0.054, standard deviation = 0.013). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) Table III to impute the dollar demand shock required to increase price by 1% (the negative of this is the price semielasticity). We use specification (9) to impute the percentage demand shock required to increase price by 1% (the negative of this is the price elasticity).
Demand shock that induces a +1% return
Level of A 1 in $ million in % of market cap. The sample includes 191 stocks that were added to the S&P 500 between September 1976 and September 1989 and were not the subject of contemporaneously reported news. To control for the level of arbitrage risk, we exclude stocks in the extreme two quartiles of the arbitrage risk distribution (measure A 1 ). We split the remaining 96 stocks into above-median and below-median demand shock groups. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated by summing returns over the CRSP value-weighted market index. The standard error of each series is approximately 0.40% at day 0, 0.90% at day +10, and 1.10% at day +20.
-0.50% 0.00% 0.50% The sample includes 191 stocks that were added to the S&P 500 between September 1976 and September 1989 and were not the subject of contemporaneously reported news. To control for the size of the index fund demand shock, we exclude stocks in the extreme two quartiles of the shock size distribution. We split the remaining 96 stocks into above-median and below-median arbitrage risk groups, using measure A 1 . Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated by summing returns over the CRSP value-weighted market index. The standard error of each series is approximately 0.40% at day 0, 0.80% at day +10, and 1.00% at day +20.
-0.50% 0.00% 0.50% Trading day relative to event Mean cumulative abnormal return
High risk
Low risk
